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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 







T.R., a minor, individually, by and through her parent, 
Barbara Galarza, and on behalf of all others similarly 
situated; BARBARA GALARZA, individually, and on behalf 
of all others similarly situated; A.G., a minor, individually, by 
and through his parent, Margarita Peralta, and on behalf of all 
others similarly situated; MARGARITA PERALTA, 
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated; 
L.R.; D.R., a minor, individually, by and through her parent, 
Madeline Perez, and on behalf of all others similarly situated; 
J.R.; MADELINE PEREZ, individually, and on behalf of all 
others similarly situated; R.H., a minor, individually, by and 
through his parent, Manqing Lin, and on behalf of all others 
similarly situated; MANQING LIN, individually, and on 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________________ 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge.  
Appellant-Plaintiffs brought a putative class action against 
the School District of Philadelphia claiming shortcomings in 
the School District’s translation and interpretation services that 
purportedly amount to a violation of the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”).  The IDEA seeks to 
ensure that the unique needs of each child in special education 
are provided for in accordance with individualized education 
plans.  Plaintiffs appeal both an order denying their class 
certification motion and a summary judgment order wherein 
the District Court declined to find that Plaintiffs met a systemic 




For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm.   
I. INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 
A. Procedural Safeguards 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1400 et seq., is a statute that offers federal funding to States 
for the education of children with disabilities.  See, e.g., 
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 
137 S. Ct. 988, 993 (2017).  “In exchange for the funds, a State 
pledges to comply with a number of statutory conditions.”  Id.  
The primary condition is that the participating State provide a 
“free appropriate public education,” or “FAPE,” to all eligible 
children.  Id. (citing § 1412(a)(1)).  The IDEA does not 
mandate what a FAPE must substantively include beyond a 
few basic minima, most obviously that the education be 
provided under public supervision and without charge.  See 
§ 1401(9)(A) (partial definition of FAPE).  The substance of a 
FAPE is primarily defined to be such “special education and 
related services” that “are provided in conformity with [a 
child’s] individualized education program,” or “IEP.”  
§ 1401(9)(D); see also § 1414(d)(1)(A) (defining IEP); 
§ 1401(29) (defining special education); Fry v. Napoleon 
Cmty. Schs., 137 S. Ct. 743, 749 (2017) (apologizing for this 
“acronymic world”). 
The IEP is the “centerpiece” of the IDEA and the “primary 
vehicle” for implementing the congressional policy underlying 




documents the child’s current ‘levels of academic 
achievement,’ specifies ‘measurable annual goals’ for how she 
can ‘make progress in the general education curriculum,’ and 
lists the ‘special education and related services’ to be provided 
so that she can ‘advance appropriately toward [those] goals.’”  
Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 749 (alteration in original) (quoting 
§ 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I), (II), (IV)(aa)).  In requiring 
individualized education programs, the “IDEA operates from 
the premise that each child will have unique disabilities and 
presumes that each program will be personalized.”  Blackman 
v. District of Columbia, 633 F.3d 1088, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(Brown, J., concurring).  Reinforcing the personalized nature 
of special education, each child’s IEP is created by the child’s 
“IEP Team,” which consists of the child’s parents, at least one 
“regular education teacher” of the child (“if the child is, or may 
be, participating in the regular education environment”), and 
certain other persons.  § 1414(d)(1)(B).  “[P]arents play[] a 
‘significant role’” in the process of creating an IEP.  
Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 524 (2007) 
(quoting Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005)).   
So that parents’ participation in the IEP process is assured, 
the IDEA requires that state educational agencies establish 
certain procedural safeguards.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a).  One 
procedural safeguard mandated by the IDEA is that an 
educational agency give parents “[w]ritten prior notice” 
whenever the agency proposes to change, or refuses to change, 
the provisions of a child’s IEP.  § 1415(b)(3); 34 C.F.R. 




is called a Notice of Recommended Educational 
Placement/Prior Written Notice (“NOREP/PWN”).  This 
notice must be given “in the native language of the parents, 
unless it clearly is not feasible to do so.”  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(b)(4); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(c)(1)(ii) (parroting 
statute). 
The implementing regulations also mandate certain 
procedural safeguards for parents at IEP Team meetings.  “The 
public agency must give the parent a copy of the child’s IEP at 
no cost to the parent.”  34 C.F.R. § 300.322(f) (regulation on 
“Parent participation” for IEP Team meetings). Further, 
educational agencies must take “whatever action is necessary” 
to allow parents to understand IEP Team meetings, “including 
arranging for an interpreter.”  Id. § 300.322(e).  There is, 
however, no regulation explicitly mandating that IEPs or draft 
IEPs be translated into the parent’s native language. 
These procedural safeguards would, of course, be of limited 
value if parents were unaware of the rights that the safeguards 
afford.  So the IDEA requires that an explanation and copy of 
the procedural safeguards be given to parents at least once a 
year.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.504(a).  In 
Pennsylvania, this explanation is called the Procedural 
Safeguards Notice.  The explanation and copy of the 
procedural safeguards must be provided in the parent’s native 
language “unless it clearly is not feasible to do so.”  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(d)(2); 34 C.F.R. § 300.504(d). 




safeguards cannot be gainsaid. . . . Congress placed every bit 
as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving 
parents and guardians a large measure of participation . . . as it 
did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP against a 
substantive standard.”  Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 
205–06 (1982); see also, e.g., H.E. v. Walter D. Palmer 
Leadership Learning Partners Charter Sch., 873 F.3d 406, 413 
(3d Cir. 2017) (holding that vindication of procedural rights 
under IDEA makes a party a prevailing party for purpose of 
attorneys’ fees).  However, the IDEA provides relief only for 
the denial of a FAPE, not for the denial of a procedural right.  
Cf. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 755 (“[T]he only relief the IDEA makes 
available is relief for the denial of a FAPE.” (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
Congress addressed this oddity in a 2004 amendment to the 
IDEA which provides that a procedural violation can rise to the 
level of a deprivation of a FAPE when the procedural violation 
either:  
(I) impeded the child’s right to a free appropriate 
public education;  
(II) significantly impeded the parents’ 
opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking 
process regarding the provision of a free 
appropriate public education to the parents’ 
child; or  




Pub. L. No. 108-446, sec. 101, § 615(f)(3)(E)(ii), 118 Stat. 
2647, 2722 (2004) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)); 
34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2) (parroting statute); see, e.g., C.H. v. 
Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 66–67 (3d Cir. 2010); 
see also Jon Romberg, The Means Justify the Ends: Structural 
Due Process in Special Education Law, 48 Harv. J. on Legis. 
415, 439–42 (2011) (describing history of § 1415(f)(3)(E)).  As 
shorthand, we will refer to the second type of procedural 
violation as a denial of a parent’s right to “meaningful 
participation.”  Cf., e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(B) (finding of 
Congress that “the education of children with disabilities can 
be made more effective by . . . ensuring that families . . . have 
meaningful opportunities to participate”); D.S. v. Bayonne Bd. 
of Educ., 602 F.3d 553, 565 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding no 
actionable procedural violation because parents “had an 
opportunity to participate meaningfully in the creation of an 
IEP”). 
B. Administrative Exhaustion Requirement 
The IDEA establishes a detailed administrative mechanism 
for resolving disputes about whether an educational agency has 
complied with the IDEA.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1415.  This 
mechanism includes procedures for the filing of complaints 
(see § 1415(b)(6)–(7)), mediation (§ 1415(e)), impartial due 
process hearings conducted by a hearing officer (§ 1415(f)), 
and appeals of hearing officer findings to the state educational 
agency (§ 1415(g)).  The IDEA also provides that after these 
administrative proceedings have concluded, an aggrieved party 




court.  § 1415(i)(2).  This detailed statutory regime makes it 
“clear . . . that Congress intended plaintiffs to complete the 
administrative process before resorting to federal court.”  
Komninos v. Upper Saddle River Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d 775, 
778 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 
1011–12 (1984)). 
Despite the IDEA’s administrative exhaustion requirement, 
our Court has acknowledged that a plaintiff’s failure to exhaust 
may be excused “where: (1) exhaustion would be futile or 
inadequate; (2) the issue presented is purely a legal question; 
(3) the administrative agency cannot grant relief; [or] (4) 
exhaustion would cause severe or irreparable harm.”  D.E. v. 
Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 275 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(citing Komninos, 13 F.3d at 778) (analyzing futility 
exception).  “Absent the existence of any of those exceptions, 
failure to exhaust will deprive a federal court of subject matter 
jurisdiction.”  Id.  We have also stated that exhaustion is not 
required where plaintiffs “allege systemic legal deficiencies 
and, correspondingly, request system-wide relief that cannot be 
provided (or even addressed) through the administrative 
process.”  Beth V. by Yvonne V. v. Carroll, 87 F.3d 80, 89 (3d 
Cir. 1996).  Yet we have suggested that this exception—we 
will call it the “systemic exception”—“merely flows implicitly 
from, or is in fact subsumed by, the futility and no-
administrative-relief exceptions.”  Id. (remanding to district 
court to determine whether plaintiffs’ claim fell within any 
recognized exception to exhaustion).  




beyond claims brought under the IDEA.  Section 1415(l) 
requires administrative exhaustion of any claims that “seek[] 
relief that is also available” under the IDEA.  20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(l).  Of course, the IDEA is not the only statute 
protecting the interests of schoolchildren with disabilities and 
their parents.  See Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 749.  For example, Title II 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12131 et seq., forbids any “public entity” from 
discriminating on the basis of disability and “requires a public 
entity to make ‘reasonable modifications’ to its ‘policies, 
practices, or procedures’ to avoid such discrimination.”  Fry, 
137 S. Ct. at 749 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)).  Section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, provides 
similar protections.  Id.  The Equal Educational Opportunities 
Act (“EEOA”) requires state educational agencies to “take 
appropriate action to overcome language barriers that impede 
equal participation by its students.”  20 U.S.C. § 1703(f).  And 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of national origin in federally 
funded programs.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 
A central exhaustion question then is how to determine 
whether a non-IDEA claim “seek[s] relief that is also 
available” under the IDEA.  In Fry, the Supreme Court held 
that “a court should look to the substance, or gravamen of the 
plaintiff’s complaint.”  137 S. Ct. at 752.  As to how a court 
should determine whether the gravamen of a complaint 
concerns the denial of a FAPE, the Supreme Court provided 




and one “sign.”  Id. at 756.  The two questions are: 
First, could the plaintiff have brought essentially 
the same claim if the alleged conduct had 
occurred at a public facility that was not a 
school—say, a public theater or library? And 
second, could an adult at the school—say, an 
employee or visitor—have pressed essentially 
the same grievance? 
Id. (“When the answer to those questions is yes, a complaint” 
is likely not for the denial of FAPE).  The “sign” that the 
gravamen of a complaint concerns the denial of a FAPE will 
appear in the procedural history: “A plaintiff’s initial choice to 
pursue [the administrative] process may suggest that she is 
indeed seeking relief for the denial of a FAPE—with the shift 
to judicial proceedings prior to full exhaustion reflecting only 
strategic calculations about how to maximize the prospect of 
such a remedy.”  Id.; see also Wellman v. Butler Area Sch. 
Dist., 877 F.3d 125, 131–36 (3d Cir. 2017) (applying Fry 
framework). 
II. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Because we are reviewing the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the School District, we examine 
the factual background, drawn from evidence in the record, in 
the light most favorable to Plaintiffs.  See, e.g., Matheis v. CSL 




A. The School District of Philadelphia 
The School District of Philadelphia oversees hundreds of 
public schools providing educational programs to hundreds of 
thousands of enrolled students.  Given the size and diversity of 
such enrollment, there are, unsurprisingly, some enrolled 
students within the School District—and parents of enrolled 
students—who have limited English proficiency (“LEP”), 
meaning English is not their primary language so that they 
have a “limited ability to read, write, speak, or understand 
English.”  T.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. (Class Cert. Op.), No. 15-
cv-04782, 2019 WL 1745737, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 2019) 
(citing, inter alia, Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance 
Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against National 
Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient 
Persons, 67 Fed. Reg. 41455, 41457 (June 18, 2002)).  School 
District records from 2013 show that there were approximately 
25,900 families of enrolled students whose primary home 
language was not English and 19,670 families who had 
expressly requested documents from the School District in a 
language other than English.  Id. at *1. 
The School District’s Office of Family and Community 
Engagement (“FACE”) provides translation and interpretation 
services to support LEP parents.  See T.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. 
(Summary Judgment Op.), 458 F. Supp. 3d 274, 279 (E.D. Pa. 
2020).  Some general, standard documents—like the School 
District’s attendance policy—are translated into common 
languages and made publicly available on the school’s website.  




translation or interpretation services be provided by a Bilingual 
Counseling Assistant (“BCA”), either through FACE or 
directly from a BCA.  Employees can have a BCA translate 
day-to-day communications, like permission slips, or have a 
BCA provide live interpretation at meetings, like report card 
conferences.  However, “the demand for interpreters often 
exceeds the number of staff available” so that “not all 
employee requests for translation are fulfilled.”  Id.   School 
District employees can also call and request interpretation 
services from the Language Line—a telephonic interpretation 
service. 
Translation and interpretation services are necessary to 
support LEP parents of enrolled students with disabilities.  As 
of November 2013, the School District reported that 1,500 LEP 
students were receiving special education and that there were 
1,887 students with IEPs whose primary home language was 
something other than English.  Class Cert. Op., 2019 WL 
1745737, at *10.  Records also indicated that in the 2015–2016 
and 2016–2017 school years there were, respectively, 3,507 
and 3,782 special education students whose primary home 
language was not English.  Id. 
B. Plaintiffs 
In August 2015, Margarita Peralta and her ward, A.G, and 
Barbara Galarza and her child, T.R.—the Original Plaintiffs—
filed a complaint against the School District.  Importantly, 
A.G. and T.R. had exhausted administrative remedies and 




the hearing officer had found that Ms. Peralta and Ms. Galarza 
were each “denied meaningful parental participation,” he 
awarded compensatory education to A.G. and T.R.  In their 
District Court complaint, Original Plaintiffs sought additional 
declaratory and injunctive relief against the School District as 
described infra Section II.C. 
In April 2017, Original Plaintiffs amended the complaint to 
include additional plaintiffs—Madeline Perez and her children 
and Manqing Lin and her child.  Subsequently, Original 
Plaintiffs dismissed their claims against the School District 
with prejudice, leaving only the plaintiff-appellants who bring 
this appeal.  We will summarize the pertinent facts relating to 
these remaining Plaintiffs. 
1. Madeline Perez and her children, L.R. and D.R. 
Madeline Perez is the mother of three children with 
disabilities, two of whom are still named plaintiffs in this 
case—L.R. and D.R.  Ms. Perez is LEP and speaks Spanish.  
“[W]hile there have been issues as to which Ms. Perez and the 
District collaborated [regarding the appropriate placements 
and service for her children], there have also been many 
occasions on which Ms. Perez has not fully understood 
educational issues relating to her children due to lack of 
adequate interpretation services.”  JA13841 (Plaintiffs’ 
Response to School District’s Statement of Undisputed Facts 
¶ 41).  Ms. Perez believes she would “be able to contribute 
 




more fully [at IEP Team Meetings] if she received translated 
IEPs” and other documents.  Id. (¶ 40). 
As to the claims in the operative complaint, Ms. Perez and 
her children have not exhausted their administrative remedies. 
2. Manqing Lin and her child, R.H. 
Manqing Lin is the mother of one child with disabilities in 
the School District—R.H.  “Although Ms. Lin is able to 
understand and speak some English words, she has limited 
English proficiency and speaks only Mandarin at home with 
R.H.’s father and their children.”  JA1399 (Plaintiffs’ 
Statement of Additional Facts ¶ 64).  Ms. Lin has provided 
input and changes to R.H.’s IEP.  However, her ability to 
provide input at IEP Team meetings is hampered by the fact 
that the School District does not provide her with translated 
draft IEPs or other IEP-related documents before meetings.   
Prior to joining this litigation, Ms. Lin requested mediation 
through Pennsylvania’s Office for Dispute Resolution and 
ultimately reached an agreement with the School District.  In 
that mediation agreement, the School District agreed to provide 
translated final IEPs and some IEP-related evaluation reports.  
The School District also “provides Ms. Lin with access to a 
BCA and the school’s Special Education Liaison to review the 
draft documents in advance of the [IEP Team] meetings,” but, 
even after the IEP Team meetings, Ms. Lin remained unable to 
fully understand the reports on R.H. provided by the School 




special education terminology.  JA1379–80 (Plaintiffs’ 
Response to School District’s Statement of Undisputed Facts 
¶ 33). 
Like Ms. Perez and her children, Ms. Lin and R.H. have not 
exhausted their administrative remedies. 
C. Complaint and Motion to Dismiss 
The operative complaint is styled as a “Class Action 
Complaint” brought by the Plaintiffs on behalf of all similarly 
situated individuals.2  It contains seven counts, six of which are 
before us.3  Count One alleges a violation of the IDEA for 
“Failure to Provide Meaningful Parental and Student 
Participation.”  JA355.  Counts Three through Five allege 
violations of other federal statutes—the Rehabilitation Act, 
ADA, EEOA, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act—and a 
chapter of the Pennsylvania Code.  The remaining counts 
allege violations of chapters of the Pennsylvania Code for 
failure to completely and timely translate certain “IEP process 
documents,” including IEPs, NOREP/PWNs, and Procedural 
Safeguard Notices (Count Six), and “regular education forms” 
 
2 Two classes are defined: the “Parent Class” consisting of all 
LEP parents of children with disabilities who are now or in the 
future will be enrolled in the School District, and the “Student 
Class” consisting of all the children of such parents regardless 
of the child’s English proficiency.  JA1154–55 (Motion for 
Class Certification).   




(Count Seven).  JA362–63. 
The complaint alleges that the School District “has adopted 
a systemic policy of failing to provide sufficient interpretation 
services and to timely and completely translate IEP process 
documents and regular education forms.”  JA343–44 (Compl. 
¶ 60).  While the complaint acknowledges that the School 
District has provided some translation services at IEP Team 
meetings, it asserts that the School District’s “incomplete, 
inconsistent effort has not and cannot facilitate the requisite 
meaningful parent participation.”  JA345 (Compl. ¶ 67). 
As for relief, the complaint requests, inter alia, that the 
District Court “Order that the [School] District adopt and 
implement a new written special education plan and [School] 
District policy to provide legally mandated translation and 
sufficient interpretation services to members” of the classes 
and “Order that the [School] District timely translate and 
deliver all IEP process documents to all members of the Parent 
Class and the Student Class as needed in the appropriate native 
language in advance of IEP meetings to ensure meaningful 
participation.”  JA363.  The Plaintiffs do not seek 
individualized damages or remedies for L.R., D.R., or R.H. 
The School District moved to dismiss the original 
complaint—while T.R. and A.G. were still plaintiffs—under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that absent 
class members failed to exhaust administrative remedies.4  The 
 




School District posited that the putative class members were 
not excused from the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement “because 
the Complaint does not adequately allege a systemic legal 
deficiency.”  T.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 223 F. Supp. 3d 321, 
329 (E.D. Pa. 2016).  The District Court rejected that argument 
and denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the 
complaint alleges a “systemic legal deficiency—namely, the 
insufficient and untimely provision of interpretation and 
translation services.”  Id. at 330.  However, the Court made 
clear that it was “certainly possible that a developed record 
may not establish Plaintiffs’ systemic legal deficiency theory.”  
Id. 
D. Denial of Motion for Class Certification 
In August 2018, Plaintiffs filed a motion for class 
certification pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) 
and 23(b)(2).  In April 2019, the District Court denied 
Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification.  Class Cert. Op., 2019 
WL 1745737.  Although the District Court rejected the School 
District’s challenges to the proposed class definitions, the 
Court found that Plaintiffs did not meet their burden of 
establishing both numerosity and commonality under Rule 
23(a).5  Id. at *9–*17.  Most relevant for our purposes is the 
 
for failure to state a claim. 
5 The District Court also found that Plaintiffs did not satisfy the 
implicit cohesiveness requirement of Rule 23(b)(2) because 
“the concept of ‘meaningful participation’ is highly fact-




Court’s treatment of commonality. 
The District Court determined that “the legal crux of this 
matter does not turn on any statutory or regulatory mandate 
that the School District provide translation and interpretation 
services in connection with the provision of special education 
services.”  Id. at *14.  “Rather, the statutory mandate at issue 
here . . . is the requirement that the School District provide 
enough language services to allow for ‘meaningful 
participation’ by parents.”  Id.  This focus on “meaningful 
participation” made a determination of commonality 
impossible, the Court explained, “because there are varying 
circumstances that could affect whether the particular services 
provided by the School District were enough or were 
insufficient to satisfy the right of meaningful participation.”  
Id. at *16. 
Furthermore, the District Court determined that “the School 
District provides significant discretion to the relevant child-
study personnel . . . to engage parents and provide appropriate 
language services.”  Id. at *17.  “[D]iscretion is necessary to 
 
that would ensure meaningful participation.”  Class Cert. Op., 
2019 WL 1745737, at *22.  See generally, e.g., Gates v. Rohm 
& Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 264 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[I]t is well 
established that the class claims must be cohesive. . . . The 
disparate factual circumstances of class members may prevent 
a class from being cohesive and, therefore, make the class 
unable to be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).” (internal citations 




ensure that limited English proficient parents are given the 
tools they need to participate without, for example, taking the 
unnecessary steps of translating documents for parents who are 
unable to read proficiently or for whom written translation of a 
complex document would be overwhelming.”  Id.  Thus, 
Plaintiffs did not actually “challenge a centralized policy 
enforced by a single decision-maker, but rather target[ed] 
individualized decisions by various case supervisors, school 
principals, and teachers as to what services are required in each 
particular case.”  Id. 
Plaintiffs timely appealed the District Court’s order 
denying their motion for class certification.6 
E. Grant of School District’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
On April 30, 2020, the District Court granted the School 
District’s motion and entered judgment in its favor on the 
grounds that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative 
remedies.  Plaintiffs admitted that they had not exhausted 
administrative remedies but argued that their claims fell within 
the futility exception to exhaustion because they had 
 
6 Prior to the District Court’s order granting the School 
District’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs petitioned 
for leave to appeal the class certification order under 
Rule 23(f).  See Petition, No. 19-8014 (3d Cir. May 2, 2019).  
Our Court denied the petition.  See Order, No. 19-8014 (3d Cir. 




challenged systemic legal deficiencies.  “In particular, . . . an 
administrative process would be futile because the hearing 
officer cannot and does not have the authority to award 
Plaintiffs’ requested relief by ensuring . . . changes to the 
District’s language services’ policies and practices.”  JA1343–
44 (Plaintiffs Br. Opposing Summ. J.).    
The District Court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument.  At the 
outset, the Court remarked that “the commonality requirement 
of Fed. Rule Civ. P. 23(a) and the systemic exception to the 
exhaustion requirement often go hand in hand” and recited 
much of its earlier analysis on Rule 23 commonality.  Summary 
Judgment Op., 458 F. Supp. 3d at 286, 288–90.  The Court then 
reasoned that after the denial of class certification, Plaintiffs 
“can only seek relief for the two parent Plaintiffs and their 
children.”  Id. at 290.  Ultimately, Plaintiffs did not satisfy a 
systemic exception to the IDEA exhaustion requirement 
because “their claims actually focus on the shortcomings of a 
particular component of the School District’s 
translation/interpretation services” and “do not rise to a truly 
systemic level in the sense that IDEA’s basic goals are 
threatened on a system-wide basis.”  Id. 
As to the remaining non-IDEA claims—under Section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, the EEOA, Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act, and Pennsylvania law—the District Court 
applied Fry’s test and determined that the gravamen of all the 
non-IDEA claims was the denial of a FAPE.  Thus, the non-
IDEA claims were subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion 




administrative remedies or satisfy an exception to exhaustion, 
the Court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of 
the School District on the entirety of the complaint. 
Plaintiffs appealed the order granting summary judgment. 
III. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Plaintiffs invoked federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1331 for their claims under the IDEA and other 
federal statutes and invoked supplemental jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 for their state law claims.  We have held 
that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a requirement for 
a district court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over an 
IDEA claim.  See Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 759 
F.3d 266, 271–72 (3d Cir. 2014).  While we later expressed 
“some doubts as to whether IDEA exhaustion is a jurisdictional 
requirement, we are bound by this precedent” and, in any 
event, we need not address whether exhaustion is jurisdictional 
because the School District preserved its exhaustion argument.  
Wellman, 877 F.3d at 130 & n.6.  Our Court has appellate 
jurisdiction over an appeal from a final judgment under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.  See, e.g., 
Matheis, 936 F.3d at 176.  We apply the same test as the 
District Court, reviewing the facts in the light most favorable 
to the non-movant—here, Plaintiffs—and granting summary 
judgment only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 




judgment as a matter of law.”  Id. (quoting Fed. Rule Civ. P. 
56(a)). 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The parties spend the bulk of their briefing discussing the 
District Court’s denial of class certification and the numerosity 
and commonality requirements of Rule 23.  But Rule 23 is a 
procedural device that cannot be interpreted to “abridge, 
enlarge or modify any substantive right.”  Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072(b)).  The threshold question then is whether the District 
Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the 
School District as to the claims of the individual Plaintiffs.  
Because we conclude for the reasons set forth below that the 
Court did not err in granting summary judgment—for both the 
IDEA claim and the non-IDEA claims—we need not address 
the class certification issues.  See, e.g., Hennessy v. FDIC, 58 
F.3d 908, 924 (3d Cir. 1995).   
A. IDEA Claim 
1. Individualization and exhaustion 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act assures 
that educational services provided for children with disabilities 
be individualized in nature.7  As the Supreme Court in Rowley 
 
7 In 1990, Congress changed the name of the Education of the 




noted, “[n]oticeably absent from the language of the statute is 
any substantive standard prescribing the level of education to 
be accorded handicapped children.”  458 U.S. at 190.  Instead, 
Congress “set forth extensive procedures to be followed in 
formulating personalized educational programs for 
handicapped children.”  Id. at 194 (emphasis added).  Each 
child has an IEP Team responsible for creating the child’s IEP.  
And a FAPE is defined as the “special education and related 
services that . . . are provided in conformity” with a child’s 
personalized IEP.  20 U.S.C. § 1401(9).  “Special education” 
is in turn defined as “specially designed instruction, at no cost 
to parents, to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability. 
. . .”  § 1401(29) (emphases added).  In sum, the “IDEA 
operates from the premise that each child will have unique 
disabilities and presumes that each program will be 
personalized.”  Blackman, 633 F.3d at 1094 (Brown, J., 
concurring). 
The IDEA’s focus on the individual also underlies its 
exhaustion requirement.  Addressing the educational needs of 
children with disabilities requires individualized assessments 
and considerations of countless concerns.  The administrative 
dispute mechanism of § 1415 sets out an interactive process 
between parents and local school officials to address such 
circumstances.  “No federal district court . . . can duplicate that 
process.”  Robinson, 468 U.S. at 1012.  When compared to 
 
Act.  See Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1141; see also 




courts, “teachers and parents, school districts, and 
administrative review boards are closest to the issues at hand, 
and therefore they are the best persons or entities to address 
individual concerns and complaints.”  Blunt v. Lower Merion 
Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 299 (3d Cir. 2014).  Allowing 
children or parents “to go directly to court . . . would . . . run 
counter to Congress’ view that the needs of handicapped 
children are best accommodated by having the parents and the 
local education agency work together to formulate an 
individualized plan for each handicapped child’s education.”  
Smith, 468 U.S. at 1011–12. 
2. Systemic exception to exhaustion 
Against this backdrop, we turn to the systemic exception to 
exhaustion.  In Beth V. by Yvonne V. v. Carroll, our Court 
stated that we viewed allegations of systemic legal deficiencies 
as a traditional basis for excusing the IDEA’s exhaustion 
requirement.  See 87 F.3d 80, 89 (3d Cir. 1996).  But we had 
no need in Beth V. to address the contours of any systemic 
exception, and since then we have not discussed the systemic 
exception in a precedential opinion.  See generally J.T. v. 
Dumont Pub. Schs., 533 F. App’x 44, 54 (3d Cir. 2013) (not 
precedential).  We draw, then, upon principles of IDEA 
exhaustion already formulated by other courts as we seek to 
give some shape to the scope of the systemic exception. 
As an initial matter, the fact that a complaint “is structured 
as a class action seeking injunctive relief, without more, does 




967 F.2d 1298, 1308 (9th Cir. 1992) (describing futility or 
inadequacy exception to exhaustion requirement).  Relatedly, 
the systemic exception is not met every time a plaintiff 
challenges centralized, uniform policies that affect all students 
within a school or school district.  See Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1304; 
Ass’n for Cmty. Living in Colo. v. Romer, 992 F.2d 1040, 1044 
(10th Cir. 1993).  Instead, to satisfy the systemic exception, a 
plaintiff must challenge policies that are “truly systemic . . . in 
the sense that the IDEA’s basic goals are threatened on a 
system-wide basis” and must not “focus[] on the shortcomings 
of a particular component of . . . special education.”  Hoeft, 967 
F.2d at 1305; see also Parent/Pro. Advoc. League v. City of 
Springfield, 934 F.3d 13, 27–28 (1st Cir. 2019) (determining 
that plaintiffs did not allege truly systemic failures and 
declining to decide whether to recognize systemic exception to 
IDEA’s exhaustion requirement). 
Claims that do meet the systemic exception often challenge 
policies that concern the administrative dispute-resolution 
mechanism itself.  See Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1309 (“Exhaustion 
may also be excused because of inadequacy of administrative 
remedies where the plaintiffs’ substantive claims themselves 
concern the adequacy of the administrative process.”).  Given 
the congressional policies animating the exhaustion 
requirement and the superiority of local problem-solving, it is 
not surprising that the systemic exception to exhaustion is 
largely limited to those procedural violations that “effectively 
deprive[] plaintiffs of an administrative forum.”  Id. at 1305; 




Judicial Review 75–77 (1980) (justifying judicial intervention 
where courts must “make sure the channels of political 
participation and communication are kept open”). 
For example, in Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi—which our Court in 
Beth V. relied upon when recognizing the systemic 
exception—the “Plaintiffs’ complaint allege[d] that the 
defendants[] fail[ed] to make bona fide attempts to resolve 
their complaints against the Bridgeport Board of Education and 
the Connecticut Department of Children and Youth Services 
and to implement fully and conduct an informal [complaint 
resolution procedure].”  832 F.2d 748, 752 (2d Cir. 1987).  
Other cases out of the Second Circuit similarly share the 
“common element” that “plaintiffs’ problems could not have 
been remedied by administrative bodies because the 
framework and procedures for assessing and placing students 
in appropriate educational programs were at issue, or because 
the nature and volume of complaints were incapable of 
correction by the administrative hearing process.”  J.S. v. Attica 
Cent. Sch., 386 F.3d 107, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2004) (collecting 
cases). 
The takeaway from this jurisprudence is that the systemic 
exception applies when plaintiffs challenge policies that 
threaten basic IDEA goals—not mere components of special 
education programs—including policies that undermine the 
framework of the administrative hearing process.  With that in 





3. Plaintiffs do not meet the systemic exception 
In Plaintiffs’ own words, “[i]t is undisputed that the 
[School] District provides some translation and interpretation 
services to LEP parents; Plaintiffs dispute the adequacy of the 
quantity, quality, and consistency of those services resulting 
from the [School] District’s policies and practices.”  JA1367 
(Plaintiffs’ Response to School District’s Statement of 
Undisputed Facts ¶ 16).  By its terms, such a challenge does 
not meet the requirements of the systemic exception.   
Although the parental right of meaningful participation 
could rightly be called a “basic goal” of the IDEA, the 
provision of translation and interpretation services is only one 
component of ensuring meaningful participation.  See, e.g., 34 
C.F.R. § 300.322(e) (“The public agency must take whatever 
action is necessary to ensure that the parent understands the 
proceedings of the IEP Team meeting, including arranging for 
an interpreter.” (emphasis added)).  Plaintiffs admit as much.  
See Oral Arg. Recording at 14:43–15:48 (“I actually think, 
your Honor, that we are seeking relief for a component of 
meaningful participation by parents . . . .”).  And as the District 
Court correctly observed, whether a parent needs a certain 
translation or interpretation service in order to meaningfully 
participate requires an individualized inquiry.  See Summary 
Judgment Op., 458 F. Supp. 3d at 289–90. 
Plaintiffs’ claim also does not implicate policies which 
undermine access to the administrative hearing process itself.  




of the right of meaningful participation, then a parent is still 
free to pursue administrative procedures to remedy that denial 
of a FAPE.  Of course, this relief cannot be obtained if the 
parent is unaware that he or she can turn to administrative 
procedures.  Consequently, the most troubling parts of the 
record before us are indications that some parents in the School 
District do not receive or cannot access translated versions of 
the Procedural Safeguards Notice.  See, e.g., JA1439 (Perng 
Decl. ¶ 14) (“I am aware that the District has Procedural 
Safeguards translated but many parents report to me that they 
have not received a translated version of this document.”); see 
also Br. for Amici Curiae Pennsylvania Immigration and 
Citizenship Coalition et al., 15, 23–25. 
But Plaintiffs do not claim that they have been harmed by 
the School District’s failure to provide a translated Procedural 
Safeguards Notice.  Indeed, the only claim from any Plaintiff 
that is specific to the Procedural Safeguards Notice is from Ms. 
Perez’s declaration that, while the School District does 
translate the notice and it may sometimes be given to LEP 
parents, she has not received a Spanish version since her 
deposition in the instant litigation.  Plaintiffs’ alleged harms 
stem from the School District’s failure to translate documents 
like NOREP/PWNs and draft IEPs or provide interpretation 
services which prevents Plaintiffs from meaningfully 
participating in IEP Team meetings.  See Class Cert. Op., 2019 
WL 1745737, at *14 (“[T]he statutory mandate at issue here . 
. . is the requirement that the School District provide enough 




parents in the education of their special needs students.”).  This 
claim does not meet the systemic exception to exhaustion. 
Plaintiffs resist this conclusion by pointing to the fact that 
the hearing officer for T.R. and A.G. stated that he had “no 
authority to order wholesale changes in the [School] District’s 
policies or practices.”  JA134.  Under Plaintiffs’ conception, 
exhausting the administrative process is futile because the 
process cannot result in the Plaintiffs’ desired relief of 
wholesale, systemic changes to the School District’s 
translation and interpretation services.  But Plaintiffs 
misunderstand the import of the hearing officer’s decision.  
The hearing officer was faced with a demand to certify a class 
at the administrative level and enter relief for all LEP parents 
in the School District.  The hearing officer correctly concluded 
that he had no authority to find that a policy was a per se 
violation of the IDEA or that a policy resulted in violation for 
all similarly situated students or parents.  If this truism—that 
administrative hearings cannot order class-wide relief—were 
sufficient to satisfy the systemic exception, the IDEA’s 
exhaustion requirement would be meaningless every time Rule 
23 relief was invoked. 
Looking beyond Plaintiffs’ class-action overtures, it is clear 
that they can obtain relief through the administrative process.  
As the same hearing officer explained, “[i]f a systemic policy 
or practice yields a violation of an individual student or 
parent’s rights,” the hearing officer may “enjoin schools from 
implementing [the] policy” and “order the [School] District to 




both Ms. Perez and Ms. Lin could bring the same IDEA claim 
from their complaint before a hearing officer who could then 
order that the School District provide each parent with 
translated IEPs, more qualified or consistent interpretation 
services, or whatever process would ensure meaningful 
participation for that parent.8  Both the claim and the relief 
would be individualized, even if the relief could create 
spillover benefits for other LEP parents and thus “could, in 
theory, provide a universally positive outcome.”  Summary 
Judgment Op., 458 F. Supp. 3d at 290. 
Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies 
under the IDEA.  Their failure to exhaust cannot be excused by 
invoking the systemic exception to exhaustion.  Thus, the 
District Court properly concluded that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction as to Plaintiffs’ IDEA claim, and we will affirm. 
B. Non-IDEA Claims 
Remaining for our review are Plaintiffs’ non-IDEA claims 
for violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the 
ADA, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, the EEOA, and 
Pennsylvania law.  As to three of those claims—under the 
Rehabilitation Act, ADA, and Pennsylvania law—Plaintiffs 
rely on the same arguments they deployed in opposing 
summary judgment on their IDEA claim.  For the same reasons 
 
8 Indeed, Ms. Lin secured in mediation an agreement with the 
School District for some translation and interpretation services 




as those set forth above, we will affirm as to these claims. 
With respect to the remaining Title VI and EEOA claims, 
Plaintiffs argue that their claims are not subject to IDEA’s 
exhaustion requirement.  Recall that the IDEA’s exhaustion 
requirement applies to claims “under the Constitution, the 
[ADA], title V of the Rehabilitation Act [including § 504], or 
other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with 
disabilities” where the relief sought is the denial of a FAPE.  
Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 750 (alterations in original) (quoting 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(l)).  Whether a suit seeks relief for denial of a 
FAPE is determined by looking to the gravamen of the 
complaint, both as a whole and with respect to each individual 
claim.  See Wellman, 877 F.3d at 132.  Plaintiffs argue that the 
gravamen of their two claims is for something other than the 
denial of a FAPE.9  A review of their complaint convinces us 
 
9 Plaintiffs do not suggest that claims under Title VI or the 
EEOA fall outside the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement because 
those statutes are not “Federal laws protecting the rights of 
children with disabilities.”  20 U.S.C. § 1415(l).  Several 
district courts in this circuit have suggested that because Title 
VI prohibits racial and national origin discrimination, but not 
disability discrimination, claims under Title VI do not fall 
within § 1415(l).  See D.C. v. Pittsburgh Pub. Schs., 415 F. 
Supp. 3d 636, 653 n.4 (W.D. Pa. 2019); Blunt v. Lower Merion 
Sch. Dist., 559 F. Supp. 2d 548, 561 (E.D. Pa. 2008), aff’d, 767 
F.3d 247, 255, 264 n.28 (3d Cir. 2014) (dismissing cross-





The factual allegations in the complaint recount at length 
how the School District’s under-provision of translation and 
interpretation services has compromised the educational 
services provided to the members of the Student Class and the 
meaningful participation rights of members of the Parent Class.  
Each count, after incorporating these factual allegations, 
realleges denial of a FAPE under a different guise.  In their 
Title VI count, Plaintiffs assert that the School District’s under-
provision of translation and interpretation services fails “to 
ensure meaningful participation by Parent Plaintiffs and 
members of the Parent Class.”  JA360 (Compl. ¶ 128).  In their 
EEOA count, Plaintiffs allege that the School District “has 
impeded equal participation by Student Plaintiffs and the 
members of the Student Class in the [School] District’s special 
education and other instructional programs.”  JA359 (Compl. 
¶ 125).  Furthermore, every count of the complaint requests a 
common set of declaratory and injunctive relief regardless of 
the right allegedly violated. 
The Plaintiffs fare no better under Fry’s suggested 
inquiries.  Clearly, the Plaintiffs could not have brought the 
same claims—about participation in educational services—
against a public theater or library.  See 137 S. Ct. at 756–57.  
 
merits).  Because Plaintiffs contest only the “gravamen” 
portion of the exhaustion inquiry and have not argued that 





Nor could Plaintiffs have brought these claims as mere visitors 
to a school within the School District.  Id.  In other words, these 
are “not the sort of claim[s] that would be brought by a 
nonstudent against a non-school facility.”  Wellman, 877 F.3d 
at 134.  And the history of these proceedings supports the 
conclusion that Plaintiffs seek to remedy the denial of a FAPE.  
Original Plaintiffs to the operative complaint had already 
exhausted administrative remedies for the denial of the FAPE, 
and the operative complaint still includes in Count One a claim 
under the IDEA for denial of a FAPE.  Both facts cut against 
Plaintiffs’ position.  Cf. Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 757 (“[P]rior pursuit 
of the IDEA’s administrative remedies will often provide 
strong evidence that the substance of a plaintiff’s complaint 
concerns the denial of a FAPE, even if the complaint never 
explicitly uses that term.”). 
Because the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ non-IDEA claims is 
the denial of a FAPE, those claims are subject to the IDEA’s 
exhaustion requirement.  Plaintiffs did not exhaust their 
administrative remedies and no exception to exhaustion 
applies.  We will therefore affirm the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the School District.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs did not pursue the administrative process 
established by the IDEA for resolving claims of procedural 
violations and FAPE denials.  Because Plaintiffs’ IDEA claim 
does not fit within a systemic exception to exhaustion, we will 




jurisdiction to address Plaintiffs’ IDEA claim.  The District 
Court also could not decide Plaintiffs’ remaining non-IDEA 
claims because they too sought relief for the denial of a FAPE.  
With none of Plaintiffs’ claims surviving summary judgment, 
we have no reason to address the inherently procedural 
questions raised by their class certification motion.  We will 
affirm the orders of the District Court. 
